Why It Is Difficult To Defend the Plantinga‐Type Ontological Argument

The Plantinga‐type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility‐premise, namely, that it is possible that a MGB exists. But why affirm the possibility‐premise? Proponents of the argument could claim that they have a strong modal intuition that the possibility‐premise is true. Unfortunately, critics could likewise claim that they have a strong modal intuition that it is possible that a MGB does not exist or that it is possible that a semi‐maximally great being exists, with these premises implying that a MGB does not exist. In this paper, I argue that, in light of this objection to the possibility‐premise, the Plantinga‐type ontological argument is difficult to defend. I then, however, offer a suggestion as to how one may argue for the existence of a MGB without defending the possibility‐premise.