Joint Communications in Support of Joint Task Force South during Operation Just Cause

This study analyzes the provision of tactical and strategic communications in support of Joint Task Force South (JTF-South) during Operation Just Cause, the American invasion of Panama during the period 20 Dec. 89-12 Jan 90. The study presents a detailed analysis of communications support provided to a joint task force engaged in a contingency operation, while also recording the actual history of what occurred in this connection. Operation Just Cause was conducted in a country that had known a long and continuous U.S. military presence. Thus an extensive 'fixed-station' or strategic telecommunications infrastructure existed upon which JTF-South could build its tactical communications networks. This was critical to the quality and quantity of communications means available to JTF-South. Single channel radio was the most important tactical means of command and control communications, and use of a single document to govern all radio communications, the Joint Communications Electronics Operating Instructions, and use of a single communications security (COMSEC) variable throughout the entire theater ensured the reliability of radio communications, in spite of the risk to COMSEC. The tactical multichannel network, initially a weak area, was made useful by bringing a large contingent of tactical systems control officers and sergeants from Fort Bragg to Panama 4 days after initiation of open war. This study explains that communications in support of JTF-South, while they were a brilliant success, were not perfect, and that lessons for future operations may be derived from a study of the actions of the men and machines that provided communications during Operation Just Cause.