The Political Dimension of Political Action: What Works?

Recent articles highlight a critical shortcoming in current military operations planning occurring at the Pentagon-and elsewhere within the Army. 1 A crucial element missing is interrelationship consideration between political and military requirements-especially in operations that characterize the postCold War world.2 This article examines that failure and suggests what should be done to preclude potential problems in Bosnia and similar operations elsewhere. I stress that the military education system is perpetuating, if not compounding, the problem. In the mid-1970s, noted author Bernard Brodie observed: ' e need people who will challenge, investigate and dissect the prevailing dogmas' of our foreign policy, and of strategic studies; it is important for students of strategy to be aware of the `inevitable limitations and imperfections of scientific method in strategic analysis and decision making' particularly with regard to the imperfections of the practitioners, `whose greatest limitation is that they sometimes fail to observe true scientific discipline'; it is necessary to understand that the `most basic issues of strategy often do not lend themselves to scientific analysis . . . because they are laden with value judgments and therefore tend to escape any kind of disciplined thought'; and last, but not least, the Clausewitzian admonition on the `need to stress the superior importance of the political side of strategy to the simply technical and technological side' is particularly relevant in the . . . age [of nuclear deterrence].3 Brodie's clear admonition is as poignant today as two decades ago. The two critical points he makes are that the scientific analysis the military seeks to perform is potentially flawed because the issues of strategy do not lend themselves to military-scientific analysis, and strategy's political component is critical and should not be forgotten. It is critical to analyze in great detail the linkages between political concepts and military objectives. For example, in Somalia the military forgot political objectives and focused on military objectives.4 The result: decoupling the military from the political. The same critique might also apply to the ongoing peace enforcement (PE) or peacekeeping (PK) mission in Bosnia.5 This suggests the US military must relearn a critical lesson that emerged from the Vietnam experience-the interrelationship of political and military objectives. More times than not, the political situation defines the realm of the possible for the military. In short, the military element of power is never a pure policy option, and future strategists must leam this. Interrelationships and synergism between a strategy's political, economic and military components result in a more pragmatic and achievable national effortwhere the elements of power are synchronized. Of course, this is what end-state planning seeks to achieve.6 Future Success With these general admonitions in mind, what must the military do to successfully execute the highly political operations that characterize the postCold War world? We must never forget political primacy: the use of military force is a political act to achieve political objectives. Normally foes, who either threaten or actually use force, seek to change an opponent's political objectives to accommodate their own.7 However, this might not be the same in PK operations (PKOs). In a PKO, peace enforcers seek to create conditions to allow all sides to reach political accommodations that will preclude future use of force. This is, in fact, a change of political objectives by both sides, but more accurately, it is a change in how foes seek to achieve their objectives. Americans have not adjusted to PK or PE and other nontraditional uses of military power: they still look for bad guys. This attitude is reflected in the several attempts at legislating severe restrictions on US involvement in PKOs and the current isolationist jabs some political candidates take at the UN. …