AirLand battle tactics: an analysis of doctrine and experience.

This monograph examines whether US Army doctrine and US Air Force doctrine are compatible. In particular, this study assesses the current Air/Ground Operating System and the offensive air support it provides to U.S. Army corps commanders. The research covers Joint, Air Force, and Army doctrine. Problems which came to light as a result of Operation DESERT STORM are also considered. Finally, the Air Force and Army positions on effective air support to the ground force are compared. Ultimately, the monograph considers whether or not the system in place provides air support which allows the Army to conduct corps level actions characterized by depth, agility, synchronization, and initiative. The analysis of US Air Force doctrine shows that the service emphasized centralized control and decentralized execution. The study finds that the doctrine promotes maximum top-down planning with a focus on continuous operations which are directly controlled by the Joint Force Air Component Commander. The Air Force recommends executing interdiction as a single operation rather than allocating sorties as Battlefield Air Interdiction. The study does find that the air doctrine is supportive of Close Air Support. Army doctrine is shown to be quite different on the issue of airpower, and in particular, on interdiction. The Army's position is that campaigns, or at least land campaigns, are won by a series of decisive battles. The corps is seen as the primary echelon for fighting major battles. Army doctrine requires the corps commander to synchronize close, deep, and rear operations into one simultaneous battle which concentrates overwhelming combat power effects in space and time. The Army doctrine sees Battlefield Air Interdiction as a critical element in creating the firepower effects necessary for decisive battle. In conclusion, the study finds that the Army needs Battlefield Air Interdiction for those operations which require the corps commander to fight a major battle. The study recommends viewing the battle area as a distinct concentration of combat power in both space and time. The author suggests that the services must establish commander to commander relationships at the tactical (corps and wing) level in order to create AirLand Battlegroups which can achieve the decisive results envisioned by Army doctrine.