Fair is Foul: A Critical Analysis of UEFA Financial Fair Play
Stefan Szymanski
Abstract
Stefan Szymanski
Abstract
This paper critically analyzes the rules of the UEFA financial regulatory system for football clubs known as Financial Fair Play (FFP). I argue that the objectives of FFP are not really fairness but financial efficiency and that the rules are unlikely to achieve efficiency. I also contend that even from the perspective of fairness, the rules do little more than substitute one form of inequality for another. Finally I briefly assess the implications for the competition law challenge that was launched in May 2013 against the FFP breakeven rule.
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This paper critically analyzes the rules of the UEFA financial regulatory system for football clubs known as Financial Fair Play (FFP). I argue that the objectives of FFP are not really fairness but financial efficiency and that the rules are unlikely to achieve efficiency. I also contend that even from the perspective of fairness, the rules do little more than substitute one form of inequality for another. Finally I briefly assess the implications for the competition law challenge that was launched in May 2013 against the FFP breakeven rule.
Key concepts: Football, Competition (biology), Perspective (graphical), Economics, Finance, Business, Law, Political science