2020Unpublished venueRequires access

The Stoics

Terence Irwin

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Abstract

Abstract The Stoics argue for two apparently conflicting claims: (1) Virtue is sufficient for happiness, because it is the whole of happiness. Hence Plato and Aristotle are wrong. (2) Goods apart from virtue (as Plato and Aristotle conceive them)—health, wealth, good fortune—are preferred indifferents; they deserve rational concern even though they are not goods and contribute nothing to happiness. Hence the Cynics are wrong. The human soul has no non-rational desires; passions are not non-rational conditions, but are simply false beliefs that different sorts of preferred and non-preferred indifferents are really good and evil. Reason controls not only human life, but the providential ordering of the cosmos as a whole. This providential ordering does not undermine human freedom and responsibility. Contrary to Epicurus’ views, predetermination of our actions still allows us to act freely and to be responsible for our actions.

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Abstract The Stoics argue for two apparently conflicting claims: (1) Virtue is sufficient for happiness, because it is the whole of happiness. Hence Plato and Aristotle are wrong. (2) Goods apart from virtue (as Plato and Aristotle conceive them)—health, wealth, good fortune—are preferred indifferents; they deserve rational concern even though they are not goods and contribute nothing to happiness. Hence the Cynics are wrong. The human soul has no non-rational desires; passions are not non-rational conditions, but are simply false beliefs that different sorts of preferred and non-preferred indifferents are really good and evil. Reason controls not only human life, but the providential ordering of the cosmos as a whole. This providential ordering does not undermine human freedom and responsibility. Contrary to Epicurus’ views, predetermination of our actions still allows us to act freely and to be responsible for our actions.

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Available abstract

Abstract The Stoics argue for two apparently conflicting claims: (1) Virtue is sufficient for happiness, because it is the whole of happiness. Hence Plato and Aristotle are wrong. (2) Goods apart from virtue (as Plato and Aristotle conceive them)—health, wealth, good fortune—are preferred indifferents; they deserve rational concern even though they are not goods and contribute nothing to happiness. Hence the Cynics are wrong. The human soul has no non-rational desires; passions are not non-rational conditions, but are simply false beliefs that different sorts of preferred and non-preferred indifferents are really good and evil. Reason controls not only human life, but the providential ordering of the cosmos as a whole. This providential ordering does not undermine human freedom and responsibility. Contrary to Epicurus’ views, predetermination of our actions still allows us to act freely and to be responsible for our actions.

Key concepts: Happiness, Virtue, Passions, Soul, Philosophy, Prudence, Epistemology, Epicureanism

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