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Falsity, negation and modality: reply to Luiz Carlos Pereira

Oswaldo Chateaubriand

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Abstract

In §1 I explain that my rejection of possible (and impossible) states of affairs as a basis for an account of falsity is not part of a general rejection of modal notions but is a rejection of possible and impossible entities of any sort. I then show that my account of senses and of propositions is indeed a modal account. In §2 I examine some of Wittgenstein’s ideas about falsity, as presented by Luiz Carlos, in relation to my account of falsity and negation. In §3 I discuss the modal aspects of identification for propositions.

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In §1 I explain that my rejection of possible (and impossible) states of affairs as a basis for an account of falsity is not part of a general rejection of modal notions but is a rejection of possible and impossible entities of any sort. I then show that my account of senses and of propositions is indeed a modal account. In §2 I examine some of Wittgenstein’s ideas about falsity, as presented by Luiz Carlos, in relation to my account of falsity and negation. In §3 I discuss the modal aspects of identification for propositions.

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Available abstract

In §1 I explain that my rejection of possible (and impossible) states of affairs as a basis for an account of falsity is not part of a general rejection of modal notions but is a rejection of possible and impossible entities of any sort. I then show that my account of senses and of propositions is indeed a modal account. In §2 I examine some of Wittgenstein’s ideas about falsity, as presented by Luiz Carlos, in relation to my account of falsity and negation. In §3 I discuss the modal aspects of identification for propositions.

Key concepts: Falsity, Negation, Modal, Epistemology, Philosophy, Proposition, Relation (database), sort

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