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2020•Lecture notes in networks and systemsRequires access

Information as Basic Value of Revenue Maximization in Evolving Public Procurement

Dmitriy S. Khvalynskiy

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Key concepts: Common value auction, Economic rent, Microeconomics, Auction theory, Revenue, Value (mathematics), Revenue equivalence, Procurement

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