2020Penn Carey Law Legal Scholarship Repository (University of Pennsylvania)Open access

American Rights Jurisprudence Through Canadian Eyes

Geoff Sigalet

Open full text 2 citations

Abstract

The U.S. Supreme Court's application of varying tiers of scrutiny to different constitutional rights has been widely criticized for severing rights from any clear connection with justice.One school of thought holds that this could be cured by importing or expanding the role for "proportionality analysis" in U.S. constitutional rights doctrines.American proponents of proportionality such as Jamal Greene, Vicki Jackson, and Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer have argued that U.S. courts could more transparently respect the connection between rights and justice by following the example of Canadian courts in reasoning about the proportionality of laws as "justified infringements" of rights.Furthermore, proportionality analysis, a kind of "intermediate scrutiny for all," is thought to foster a more reasonable and democratic rights discourse.This Article argues that proportionality analysis may not be the cure its American proponents hope for.Comparisons between American and Canadian constitutional rights cases suggest that proportionality style reasoning conceptually devalues and distorts the connection between rights and justice.In contrast, the alternative concept of rights as absolute relations of justice appears to more transparently value constitutional rights.The Article then turns to the prospective institutional effects of proportionality in the American context.A rough sketch shows that the concept of courts allowing the state to proportionately override rights appears to be as scattered across different American doctrines and tiers of scrutiny as the concept of specifying the scope of rights absolutely.The mixed record of proportionality in U.S. rights doctrines recommends drawing comparisons to Canada, where proportionality is employed under a uniform doctrine.Comparing the effects of proportionality in the U.S. and Canada indicates that this approach institutionally disrupts the democratic settlement of rights disagreements in three ways.First, proportionality analysis appears to inflate the number of rights

Open-access reader

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The U.S. Supreme Court's application of varying tiers of scrutiny to different constitutional rights has been widely criticized for severing rights from any clear connection with justice.One school of thought holds that this could be cured by importing or expanding the role for "proportionality analysis" in U.S. constitutional rights doctrines.American proponents of proportionality such as Jamal Greene, Vicki Jackson, and Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer have argued that U.S. courts could more transparently respect the connection between rights and justice by following the example of Canadian courts in reasoning about the proportionality of laws as "justified infringements" of rights.Furthermore, proportionality analysis, a kind of "intermediate scrutiny for all," is thought to foster a more reasonable and democratic rights discourse.This Article argues that proportionality analysis may not be the cure its American proponents hope for.Comparisons between American and Canadian constitutional rights cases suggest that proportionality style reasoning conceptually devalues and distorts the connection between rights and justice.In contrast, the alternative concept of rights as absolute relations of justice appears to more transparently value constitutional rights.The Article then turns to the prospective institutional effects of proportionality in the American context.A rough sketch shows that the concept of courts allowing the state to proportionately override rights appears to be as scattered across different American doctrines and tiers of scrutiny as the concept of specifying the scope of rights absolutely.The mixed record of proportionality in U.S. rights doctrines recommends drawing comparisons to Canada, where proportionality is employed under a uniform doctrine.Comparing the effects of proportionality in the U.S. and Canada indicates that this approach institutionally disrupts the democratic settlement of rights disagreements in three ways.First, proportionality analysis appears to inflate the number of rights

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 2 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The U.S. Supreme Court's application of varying tiers of scrutiny to different constitutional rights has been widely criticized for severing rights from any clear connection with justice.One school of thought holds that this could be cured by importing or expanding the role for "proportionality analysis" in U.S. constitutional rights doctrines.American proponents of proportionality such as Jamal Greene, Vicki Jackson, and Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer have argued that U.S. courts could more transparently respect the connection between rights and justice by following the example of Canadian courts in reasoning about the proportionality of laws as "justified infringements" of rights.Furthermore, proportionality analysis, a kind of "intermediate scrutiny for all," is thought to foster a more reasonable and democratic rights discourse.This Article argues that proportionality analysis may not be the cure its American proponents hope for.Comparisons between American and Canadian constitutional rights cases suggest that proportionality style reasoning conceptually devalues and distorts the connection between rights and justice.In contrast, the alternative concept of rights as absolute relations of justice appears to more transparently value constitutional rights.The Article then turns to the prospective institutional effects of proportionality in the American context.A rough sketch shows that the concept of courts allowing the state to proportionately override rights appears to be as scattered across different American doctrines and tiers of scrutiny as the concept of specifying the scope of rights absolutely.The mixed record of proportionality in U.S. rights doctrines recommends drawing comparisons to Canada, where proportionality is employed under a uniform doctrine.Comparing the effects of proportionality in the U.S. and Canada indicates that this approach institutionally disrupts the democratic settlement of rights disagreements in three ways.First, proportionality analysis appears to inflate the number of rights

Key concepts: Proportionality (law), Scrutiny, Supreme court, Law, Political science, Jurisprudence, Bill of rights, Fundamental rights

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
American Rights Jurisprudence Through Canadian Eyes — Research Paper | ScholarLens