2008•The New Palgrave Dictionary of EconomicsRequires access

Strategic and Extensive Form Games

Martin J. Osborne

Abstract

The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is described. Strategic games, Bayesian games, extensive games with perfect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, subgame perfect equilibrium, and weak sequential equilibrium.

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Key concepts: Rationalizability, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Sequential equilibrium, Perfect information, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Extensive-form game, Equilibrium selection