Not All Reforms Are Big: The Development of the Field Staff During the Root Era Reforms

The Spanish American War was a turning point in the history of the United States Army. While the US Army was successful in its operational mission of defeating the Spanish in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico in 1898, it suffered from significant issues in administration, planning, and mobilization, which debilitated much of the force. The US Army and War Department were not equipped to handle the rapid mobilization of an expeditionary force due to being organized for a defense policy that emphasized a frontier constabulary and coastal defense. Despite assurances from the states to the contrary, the National Guard proved to be ill prepared for war, deficient in trained officers, men, and equipment. With the regiment as the largest peacetime formation and without a General Staff, the US Army was limited in its ability to conduct operational planning and command and control its brigades, divisions, and corps. Ultimately, the US Army fielded limited numbers of prepared regular and volunteer troops, achieving victory over the weak and isolated Spanish forces through tactical successes at battles such as San Juan Heights and Manila. The Root era reforms highlighted the ability of the Secretary of War Elihu Root to create fundamental change within the War Department and US Army. The reforms at the turn of the twentieth century created the modern United States Army, which was intellectually prepared and possessed the systems necessary for the execution of operational art in World War I. Representing a shift from the US Army’s focus at the tactical level of war and towards early operational art, using force to achieve strategic objectives, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose, the US Army improved its educational system, its management of field units, its doctrine, and began planning for contingency operations against potential adversaries. The US Army can look upon the Root era reforms as a model for implementing the lessons learned following war. It served as an opportunity for a thorough self-examination, reform, and postured the US Army to fight World War I.