René Lefebvre
Abstract
This paper is about the two ways Plato considers that pleasures can be true, as rational pleasures and as pleasures without pain. The main points under examination are the interpretation of Platonic pleasures as propositional attitudes, and the relation between pleasure itself and feeling pleasure.
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This paper is about the two ways Plato considers that pleasures can be true, as rational pleasures and as pleasures without pain. The main points under examination are the interpretation of Platonic pleasures as propositional attitudes, and the relation between pleasure itself and feeling pleasure.
Key concepts: Pleasure, Pain and pleasure, Feeling, Interpretation (philosophy), Philosophy, Relation (database), Psychology, Psychoanalysis