Wage Indexation and Exchange Market Intervention in a Small Open Economy

The analysis of this paper stresses the interdependence between wage indexation on the one hand, and exchange market intervention on the other, as tools of' macroeconomic stabilization policy in a small open economy subject to stocl-astic disturbances.It is shown how the choice of either policy instrument impinges on the effectiveness of the other.In particular, if the domestic money wage is fully indexed to some weighted average of the domestic and foreign price levels, then irrespective of what that chosen weight may be, exchange market intervention is rendered totally ineffective inofar as the stabilization of the real part of the domestic economy is concerned.Likewise, if the monetary authority intervenes in the exchange market so as to exactly accommodate for nominal movements in the demand for money, thereby rendering the excess demand for money dependent only upon real variables, then any form of wage indexation is totally ineffective for the stabilization of the real part of the system.In either polar case, the respective instrument can stabilize the domestic price level.Alternative combinations of policy for the stabilization for domestic and foreign disturbances are considered.