Evaluation of the Hiding-Countermeasure PRINCE Using Differential Power Analysis
Shu Takemoto, Yusuke Nozaki, Masaya Yoshikawa
Abstract
Shu Takemoto, Yusuke Nozaki, Masaya Yoshikawa
Abstract
Lightweight block ciphers have been proposed as encryption processing for small devices. For a typical lightweight cryptographic PRINCE, hiding countermeasure for power analysis attacks has been reported. However, this countermeasure method evaluates the tamper resistance of only one kind of power analysis attacks. Therefore, this study applies other power analysis attacks to the countermeasure to evaluate the tamper resistance. From evaluation experiments, this study clarifies that WDDL-PRINCE has high tamper resistance not only to CPA but also to DPA.
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Lightweight block ciphers have been proposed as encryption processing for small devices. For a typical lightweight cryptographic PRINCE, hiding countermeasure for power analysis attacks has been reported. However, this countermeasure method evaluates the tamper resistance of only one kind of power analysis attacks. Therefore, this study applies other power analysis attacks to the countermeasure to evaluate the tamper resistance. From evaluation experiments, this study clarifies that WDDL-PRINCE has high tamper resistance not only to CPA but also to DPA.
Key concepts: Countermeasure, Power analysis, Computer science, Block cipher, Tamper resistance, Cryptography, Computer security, Encryption