Popper’s Social Philosophy

This chapter examines the main pillars of Popper&s;s social philosophy: rationality, individualism, libertarianism, antinomianism, negative utilitarianism, piecemeal social engineering, and a sunken pillar—that of the desirable social order. It concludes that the pillars are there all right, but they are shaky and do not support a construction so profound and consistent, as well as ample and detailed, as to deserve being called a substantial social philosophy, let alone one capable of inspiring any social activists or politicians. This may explain why neo-conservatives, classical liberals, and democratic socialists have claimed that Popper is on their side. Thus, ironically, Popper&s;s legacy is no less ambiguous than Hegel&s;s or Marx&s;s. Popper&s;s social philosophy lacks a theory about social order because he has neither an adequate theory of society nor a positive moral philosophy. The chapter highlights that Popper&s;s social philosophy was flawed because he had only a sketchy and inadequate theory of society, namely ontological individualism.