A New Epistemology

Abstract This chapter explores Hume’s considered treatment of scepticism in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding in EHU 12. It finds a two-tiered epistemology in this section. First, Hume’s dismissal of antecedent scepticism suggests that he accords our faculties default authority (EHU 12.3). Having done so, we use these faculties to reflexively investigate themselves; those that are found wanting will be dismissed in line with Hume’s consequent scepticism (EHU 12.5). Pyrrhonian scepticism is founded on a problematic methodology: it either over-generalises discovered unreliability in our faculties, or ventures into enquiries for which our faculties are entirely unsuited. Thus, Hume rejects it in favour of his own mitigated scepticism, which recommends staying within the limits of our faculties. The chapter then argues against the sceptical interpretation of EHU 12, before pointing to various parallels between this account and EHU 1, EHU 5, and Part 1 of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.