Expected utility without utility
Erio Castagnoli, Marco LiCalzi
Abstract
Open-access reader
Erio Castagnoli, Marco LiCalzi
Abstract
Open-access reader
This paper advances an interpretation of Von Neumann–Morgenstern’s expected utility model for preferences over lotteries which does not require the notion of a cardinal utility over prizes and can be phrased entirely in the language of probability. According to it, the expected utility of a lottery can be read as the probability that this lottery outperforms another given independent lottery. The implications of this interpretation for some topics and models in decision theory are considered.
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This paper advances an interpretation of Von Neumann–Morgenstern’s expected utility model for preferences over lotteries which does not require the notion of a cardinal utility over prizes and can be phrased entirely in the language of probability. According to it, the expected utility of a lottery can be read as the probability that this lottery outperforms another given independent lottery. The implications of this interpretation for some topics and models in decision theory are considered.
Key concepts: Lottery, Expected utility hypothesis, Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem, Interpretation (philosophy), Subjective expected utility, Mathematical economics, Utility theory, Decision theory