‘New Agnosticism’, Imaginative Challenge, and Religious Experience

Abstract This chapter makes a contribution to recent discussions within new conceptual territory for agnosticism opened up by John Schellenberg’s work in the philosophy of religion. Critics have recently questioned whether Schellenberg’s defence of non-doxastic imaginative faith in ultimism is the most adequate non-doxastic faith stance or the most adequate proposal for a new research programme in the philosophy of religion. I consider here two possible challenges to ultimism as a non-doxastic faith stance and as a research programme: one from Kantian-inspired religious pluralism; and one from the claim that a broader religious framework proposition (‘ietsism’) is more adequate for these purposes than ultimism. The analysis pays particular attention to the role of religious experience. I conclude that notwithstanding the prima facie force of these two objections, it is still appropriate for an agnostic to embrace ultimistic non-doxastic faith.