Knowing the Rules: Planning Considerations for NATO Operations

OFFICERS OF THE U.S. Armed Forces have been familiar with inner workings of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since its inception in 1949. first commander of NATO's military forces, General of Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, was an American, as has been every Supreme Commander, Europe (SACEUR) since. When NATO employed several army groups throughout Europe, opportunities for Americans to serve in NATO billets, interact with NATO organizations, and gain understanding of NATO operations abounded. This is no longer case. United States' withdrawal of a sizable portion of its forces from Europe, increase in number of NATO nations, and ongoing transformation of Alliance provide fewer opportunities for U.S. officers to learn now NATO forces are structured, organized, and employed. Although Army's current focus is on Afghanistan and Iraq, commanders and military planners should not lose sight of requirement to understand NATO's operational capabilities and limitations. On 31 May 2005, NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) assumed responsibility for four western Afghan provinces, placing half of Afghanistan under ISAF control. As NATO and U.S.-led Global Counterterrorism Force (GCTF) gain control of more of Afghanistan, it becomes even more critical for U.S. commanders to understand capabilities and limitations of NATO's modus operandi. ISAF is NATO's first out-of-area operation; that is, outside of Europe--NATO's traditional area of interest--but it will surely not be its last. vision of a transformed NATO emphasizes a and force structure [that] must be expeditionary in character and design and ... capable of conducting a higher number of smaller, concurrent operations at some distance from home bases as well as sustaining operations over long periods of time. (1) Therefore, considerations concerning command relationships, national caveats, logistics, force generation, national resources, and communications apply to future as well as ongoing operations. These realities are not likely to change. NATO Command Relationships NATO command relationships are far more restrictive than those of U.S. Armed Forces. Other than standing headquarters that are a part of NATO command structure, NATO does not possess any forces, save a limited aerial warning capability. From NATO's perspective, its forces are borrowed manpower. As a result, authority a NATO commander can exercise over his forces is not nearly as broad as that of a U.S. commander. When a NATO nation transfers its forces to NATO command, it usually places those forces in operational control (OPCON) status. While OPCON is a term with which all U.S. officers are familiar, significant differences exist between NATO and American definitions. U.S. Department of Defense defines OPCON as the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish mission. (2) NATO definition is more restrictive, particularly with regard to task organization: The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that commander might accomplish specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of units concerned (emphasis added). (3) NATO commanders in field wield less authority over subordinate forces than their American counterparts. Complicating matters is NATO commander's inability to delegate OPCON to other commanders. Forces placed under NATO command are OPCON to highest level of command, normally SACEUR. Depending on national restrictions placed on those forces, SACEUR might or might not be authorized to delegate OPCON of those forces. …