2001Military reviewRequires access

Building the Reserve Objective Force

Gary C. Howard, Gregory K. Johnson

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Abstract

In his statement, future is no longer what it used to be, Elie Wiesel, Winner of the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize, succinctly describes the state of the US Army over the last several years. The increase in regional conflicts after the end of the Cold War has radically changed the focus of the nation's defense forces. Although much of the objective force is still in the development phase, the US Army is rapidly evolving its legacy force into an objective force that can ensure future security. The US Army Reserve (USAR) is also changing to ensure that it can fulfill its role. And, even though we do not know exactly what the future USAR will look like, there are specific features that the reserve objective force must have. Because it is a continuing process, we need not wait to incorporate some of these changes. USAR Readiness USAR readiness is a direct function of training and operations. A lack of ongoing, high-quality training does not translate simply into untrained reservists. In the end, it means no reservists. If they do not receive challenging training, they will simply quit. Thus, the reserve objective force must develop new ways to improve training and to support soldiers and units. The US Armed Forces have recently undergone a quiet revolution that makes Reserve Components (RC) ever more critical. More than half of the Army's total strength and nearly two-thirds of its combat service support (CSS) capability--edical, supply, maintenance and transportation--come from USAR and the Army National Guard (USNG) units. The USAR is particularly heavily invested in CSS. In fact, the Army can no longer conduct normal operations, let alone go to war, without the USAR Training Soldiers New demands have changed the meaning of being in the USAR. The old formula-two weeks of annual training and one weekend per month-is not sufficient to ensure adequate readiness. Aggressive mission-focused training must be conducted throughout the year at every drill weekend. Annual training must focus on real-world support missions and integrated multi-echelon exercises. The first requirement for highquality inactive duty training is to have an adequate concentration of soldiers, units and equipment. This is often difficult in an RC that is geographically disbursed. To remedy this, we propose that the Army establish a series of facilities called Army training sites (ATSs), which would position a critical mass of units, soldiers and equipment at regional branch-specific training facilities. ATSs could leverage other local resources, such as large population centers for recruiting and proximity to like units from other services and natural features with which to enhance training and readiness. Collocating functionally related units would enhance the effectiveness of distance learning and communication with doctrine schools. ATSs would also provide a valuable training site for Active Components (AC) and a means to promote joint training for AC and RC soldiers. Integrating AC soldiers into RC training would greatly enhance the quality of training for both. Of particular concern is the lack of intensive, high-quality collective training needed by officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Although the Army school system does a great job training individual soldiers, it must improve the competence and experience of officers and NCOs so they can work successfully at battalion, brigade and division levels. Intensive, year-round training in operations and operational planning must be targeted to key collective training events. Planning and preparing for these events would be accomplished by aggressive collective staff training during weekend drills. This work would combine the Army's deliberate planning process with periodic command post exercises, field training exercises and other drills at the home station or ATS. The Army currently suffers from a lack of collective-training opportunities to exercise units at the correct doctrine level. …

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In his statement, future is no longer what it used to be, Elie Wiesel, Winner of the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize, succinctly describes the state of the US Army over the last several years. The increase in regional conflicts after the end of the Cold War has radically changed the focus of the nation's defense forces. Although much of the objective force is still in the development phase, the US Army is rapidly evolving its legacy force into an objective force that can ensure future security. The US Army Reserve (USAR) is also changing to ensure that it can fulfill its role. And, even though we do not know exactly what the future USAR will look like, there are specific features that the reserve objective force must have. Because it is a continuing process, we need not wait to incorporate some of these changes. USAR Readiness USAR readiness is a direct function of training and operations. A lack of ongoing, high-quality training does not translate simply into untrained reservists. In the end, it means no reservists. If they do not receive challenging training, they will simply quit. Thus, the reserve objective force must develop new ways to improve training and to support soldiers and units. The US Armed Forces have recently undergone a quiet revolution that makes Reserve Components (RC) ever more critical. More than half of the Army's total strength and nearly two-thirds of its combat service support (CSS) capability--edical, supply, maintenance and transportation--come from USAR and the Army National Guard (USNG) units. The USAR is particularly heavily invested in CSS. In fact, the Army can no longer conduct normal operations, let alone go to war, without the USAR Training Soldiers New demands have changed the meaning of being in the USAR. The old formula-two weeks of annual training and one weekend per month-is not sufficient to ensure adequate readiness. Aggressive mission-focused training must be conducted throughout the year at every drill weekend. Annual training must focus on real-world support missions and integrated multi-echelon exercises. The first requirement for highquality inactive duty training is to have an adequate concentration of soldiers, units and equipment. This is often difficult in an RC that is geographically disbursed. To remedy this, we propose that the Army establish a series of facilities called Army training sites (ATSs), which would position a critical mass of units, soldiers and equipment at regional branch-specific training facilities. ATSs could leverage other local resources, such as large population centers for recruiting and proximity to like units from other services and natural features with which to enhance training and readiness. Collocating functionally related units would enhance the effectiveness of distance learning and communication with doctrine schools. ATSs would also provide a valuable training site for Active Components (AC) and a means to promote joint training for AC and RC soldiers. Integrating AC soldiers into RC training would greatly enhance the quality of training for both. Of particular concern is the lack of intensive, high-quality collective training needed by officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Although the Army school system does a great job training individual soldiers, it must improve the competence and experience of officers and NCOs so they can work successfully at battalion, brigade and division levels. Intensive, year-round training in operations and operational planning must be targeted to key collective training events. Planning and preparing for these events would be accomplished by aggressive collective staff training during weekend drills. This work would combine the Army's deliberate planning process with periodic command post exercises, field training exercises and other drills at the home station or ATS. The Army currently suffers from a lack of collective-training opportunities to exercise units at the correct doctrine level. …

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Available abstract

In his statement, future is no longer what it used to be, Elie Wiesel, Winner of the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize, succinctly describes the state of the US Army over the last several years. The increase in regional conflicts after the end of the Cold War has radically changed the focus of the nation's defense forces. Although much of the objective force is still in the development phase, the US Army is rapidly evolving its legacy force into an objective force that can ensure future security. The US Army Reserve (USAR) is also changing to ensure that it can fulfill its role. And, even though we do not know exactly what the future USAR will look like, there are specific features that the reserve objective force must have. Because it is a continuing process, we need not wait to incorporate some of these changes. USAR Readiness USAR readiness is a direct function of training and operations. A lack of ongoing, high-quality training does not translate simply into untrained reservists. In the end, it means no reservists. If they do not receive challenging training, they will simply quit. Thus, the reserve objective force must develop new ways to improve training and to support soldiers and units. The US Armed Forces have recently undergone a quiet revolution that makes Reserve Components (RC) ever more critical. More than half of the Army's total strength and nearly two-thirds of its combat service support (CSS) capability--edical, supply, maintenance and transportation--come from USAR and the Army National Guard (USNG) units. The USAR is particularly heavily invested in CSS. In fact, the Army can no longer conduct normal operations, let alone go to war, without the USAR Training Soldiers New demands have changed the meaning of being in the USAR. The old formula-two weeks of annual training and one weekend per month-is not sufficient to ensure adequate readiness. Aggressive mission-focused training must be conducted throughout the year at every drill weekend. Annual training must focus on real-world support missions and integrated multi-echelon exercises. The first requirement for highquality inactive duty training is to have an adequate concentration of soldiers, units and equipment. This is often difficult in an RC that is geographically disbursed. To remedy this, we propose that the Army establish a series of facilities called Army training sites (ATSs), which would position a critical mass of units, soldiers and equipment at regional branch-specific training facilities. ATSs could leverage other local resources, such as large population centers for recruiting and proximity to like units from other services and natural features with which to enhance training and readiness. Collocating functionally related units would enhance the effectiveness of distance learning and communication with doctrine schools. ATSs would also provide a valuable training site for Active Components (AC) and a means to promote joint training for AC and RC soldiers. Integrating AC soldiers into RC training would greatly enhance the quality of training for both. Of particular concern is the lack of intensive, high-quality collective training needed by officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Although the Army school system does a great job training individual soldiers, it must improve the competence and experience of officers and NCOs so they can work successfully at battalion, brigade and division levels. Intensive, year-round training in operations and operational planning must be targeted to key collective training events. Planning and preparing for these events would be accomplished by aggressive collective staff training during weekend drills. This work would combine the Army's deliberate planning process with periodic command post exercises, field training exercises and other drills at the home station or ATS. The Army currently suffers from a lack of collective-training opportunities to exercise units at the correct doctrine level. …

Key concepts: Function (biology), Use of force, Operations management, Law, Political science, Computer science, Business, Operations research

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