EU Competition Policy and Market Liberalization; Using the Gazprom Antitrust Case to Examine the EU Influence on Russian Energy Policy

To examine the EU influence on Russian energy policy, this thesis isolates EU competition policy in natural gas markets and considers the European Commission’s antitrust proceedings against Russian-state owned Gazprom. By applying the neofunctionalist principle of spillover to natural gas markets, I examine the degree to which the EU has influenced Russian energy policy. I find there exists no visible change in domestic energy policy of Russia due to the implementation of competition rules in the EU internal energy market. By examining the Gazprom antirust case, I find that the EU’s competition policy has weakened the ability of the Kremlin to use Gazprom as a tool of foreign policy. With these findings, we are able to better understand the means by which the Russian federation is able to coerce energy importing Member States using natural gas as political leverage.