2019Unpublished venueRequires access

The least dangerous branch?

Michael Hein

Open publisher page 48 citations

Abstract

This chapter discusses European constitutional and supreme courts have delivered no fewer than 154 decisions on the constitutionality of constitutional amendments from 1945 until 2016. It examines the following question: Does constitutional review of constitutional amendments empirically contribute to the protection of modern democracy, or is it endangering the people’s democratic right of self-government? The chapter addresses this question by analyzing the abovementioned 154 decisions that European national courts have made on the constitutionality of constitutional amendments from 1945 until 2016. It demonstrates that when invalidating constitutional amendments, European courts predominantly do so in a democracy-adverse, judicial activist manner. The chapter summarizes the key findings and discuss their implications for the normative debate on, and the constitutional practice of reviewing constitutional amendments. One would expect courts to be ‘the least dangerous branch’, showing judicial restraint toward constitutional amendments. Like constitutional review of statutory legislation, it fluctuates between judicial activism and judicial restraint.

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What this paper is about

This chapter discusses European constitutional and supreme courts have delivered no fewer than 154 decisions on the constitutionality of constitutional amendments from 1945 until 2016. It examines the following question: Does constitutional review of constitutional amendments empirically contribute to the protection of modern democracy, or is it endangering the people’s democratic right of self-government? The chapter addresses this question by analyzing the abovementioned 154 decisions that European national courts have made on the constitutionality of constitutional amendments from 1945 until 2016. It demonstrates that when invalidating constitutional amendments, European courts predominantly do so in a democracy-adverse, judicial activist manner. The chapter summarizes the key findings and discuss their implications for the normative debate on, and the constitutional practice of reviewing constitutional amendments. One would expect courts to be ‘the least dangerous branch’, showing judicial restraint toward constitutional amendments. Like constitutional review of statutory legislation, it fluctuates between judicial activism and judicial restraint.

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OpenAlex reports 48 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

This chapter discusses European constitutional and supreme courts have delivered no fewer than 154 decisions on the constitutionality of constitutional amendments from 1945 until 2016. It examines the following question: Does constitutional review of constitutional amendments empirically contribute to the protection of modern democracy, or is it endangering the people’s democratic right of self-government? The chapter addresses this question by analyzing the abovementioned 154 decisions that European national courts have made on the constitutionality of constitutional amendments from 1945 until 2016. It demonstrates that when invalidating constitutional amendments, European courts predominantly do so in a democracy-adverse, judicial activist manner. The chapter summarizes the key findings and discuss their implications for the normative debate on, and the constitutional practice of reviewing constitutional amendments. One would expect courts to be ‘the least dangerous branch’, showing judicial restraint toward constitutional amendments. Like constitutional review of statutory legislation, it fluctuates between judicial activism and judicial restraint.

Key concepts: Computer science

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