An EAF guard driver to prevent shellcode from removing guard pages
Shu Akabane, Tomoya Miwa, Takeshi Okamoto
Abstract
Open-access reader
Shu Akabane, Tomoya Miwa, Takeshi Okamoto
Abstract
Open-access reader
Prevention of shellcode execution can be located at the last defense line against cyberattacks on vulnerabilities. Export address filtering (EAF), a security feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard in Windows 10, prevents shellcode execution by guarding access to export address tables using guard pages. To prevent and raise awareness of a new bypass technique, we show a proof-of-concept of the new bypass technique that, by calling the NT!NtProtectVirtualMemory function, removes guard pages created by EAF. Windows shellcode with the proof-of-concept code is compatible with various versions of Windows 7 or later. To prevent the new bypass technique, we propose an EAF guard driver that prevents shellcode from removing guard pages. In tests, the driver prevented, without false alarms, the removal of the guard pages.
OpenAlex reports 2 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Prevention of shellcode execution can be located at the last defense line against cyberattacks on vulnerabilities. Export address filtering (EAF), a security feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard in Windows 10, prevents shellcode execution by guarding access to export address tables using guard pages. To prevent and raise awareness of a new bypass technique, we show a proof-of-concept of the new bypass technique that, by calling the NT!NtProtectVirtualMemory function, removes guard pages created by EAF. Windows shellcode with the proof-of-concept code is compatible with various versions of Windows 7 or later. To prevent the new bypass technique, we propose an EAF guard driver that prevents shellcode from removing guard pages. In tests, the driver prevented, without false alarms, the removal of the guard pages.
Key concepts: Guard (computer science), Computer science, Operating system, Exploit, Computer security, Security guard, Programming language