Veblen and Commons and the Concept of Community

The institutionalist literature recently has been enlivened by a dispute about the consistency of the theoretical systems of Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons. Specifically, the contention has been advanced, and challenged, that a disparity exists between Veblen’s theory of instrumental value and Commons’s theory of reasonable value (Ramstad 1989, 765–8; 1995, 999-1000; Atkinson and Reed 1990, 109; 1991, 1137–9), so basic as to render their systems not simply discordant, but competitive or substitute paradigms. One purpose of this essay is to examine, without exploring that specific question except as it touches tangentially the major topic, the question of whether, whatever the differences between Veblen and Commons, there is sufficient correspondence on major premises, and whether the concepts on which there is correspondence are sufficiently central to institutionalism, to justify their classification as part of a unified school. The concept of community, and its underlying precepts, is the major premise explored.