How to design the faultless bribery and coercion prevention electronic voting scheme
Chia‐Hui Liu, Zhen-Yu Wu, Chiung-Chiuen Chen
Abstract
Chia‐Hui Liu, Zhen-Yu Wu, Chiung-Chiuen Chen
Abstract
Bribery and coercion usually represents two serious problems in conventional voting systems. However, these problems become acute in electronic voting (e-voting) scheme due to its mobility. Recently, Wu et al. first classified the methods used to perform bribery and coercion into five levels. They proposed a level-four secure scheme which can prevent bribery and coercion even when a voter's voting processes are monitored by a briber or coercer. However, their scheme still cannot achieve the highest level -- level-five secure e-voting scheme. That is, even the major secret used for voting is revealed, a voter still can cast his/her vote without violate his/her volition. By introducing an extra setup phase and a slightly modification on the off-line disputation phase on Wu et al.'s scheme, we propose a level-five secure e-voting scheme. The proposed scheme inherits most of the advantages of Wu et al.'s scheme in the security requirement.
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Bribery and coercion usually represents two serious problems in conventional voting systems. However, these problems become acute in electronic voting (e-voting) scheme due to its mobility. Recently, Wu et al. first classified the methods used to perform bribery and coercion into five levels. They proposed a level-four secure scheme which can prevent bribery and coercion even when a voter's voting processes are monitored by a briber or coercer. However, their scheme still cannot achieve the highest level -- level-five secure e-voting scheme. That is, even the major secret used for voting is revealed, a voter still can cast his/her vote without violate his/her volition. By introducing an extra setup phase and a slightly modification on the off-line disputation phase on Wu et al.'s scheme, we propose a level-five secure e-voting scheme. The proposed scheme inherits most of the advantages of Wu et al.'s scheme in the security requirement.
Key concepts: Electronic voting, Voting, Bullet voting, Coercion (linguistics), Cardinal voting systems, Computer security, Scheme (mathematics), Computer science