Truth, Conviction and Knowledge in Criminal Procedures: On the Preconditions for Rational Cognition in the Shadow of Doubt

Any legal theory the subject of which is the problem of truth must also deal with two views of reality which, at first glance, could not be more divergent. According to one view, truth signifies conformity (“correspondence) with reality whereas, according to the other, truth is the outcome of a process of understanding. Both positions find equivalents in the german Code of Criminal Procedure which, on one hand, places a duty on the courts to explore objective truth whilst, on the other, considers the judge's convictions sufficient for performing such task. Whether this is seen as contradictory depends on the perspective from which the question of truth is posited. In a philosophical context truth can be interpreted as inherently inaccessible whereas, within the framework of practical procedures such as court cases, it is impossible to proceed without preconditions related to empirical objective points of reference, certain conventions, or the belief in the truth of opinions. In order for this belief to have an effect in persuading others, personal certainty must be able to tie in with empirical evidence not exclusively within the purview of the court. However, since recourse to knowledge from average human experience as well as insights from the natural sciences and the criterion of probability should not be mistaken for pure objectivity, there remains a concept of truth that in practical discourse, notwithstanding theoretical objections, cannot reasonably be doubted.