The Effects of State-Level GAAP Regulation on Municipal Audit Markets, Reporting Quality, and Audit Fees

ABSTRACT We examine the effects of financial statement disclosure regulation on auditor market concentration, reporting quality, and audit pricing. We compare auditor industry concentration levels for municipalities reporting under the Single Audit Act in the state of Michigan, which requires GAAP reporting, with concentration rates in Pennsylvania, which has unregulated reporting. We find an association between a comprehensive GAAP disclosure policy and auditor concentration. The disclosure-regulated state also has higher demand for auditor specialization and reporting quality, as evidenced through lower reporting of material weaknesses and shorter reporting lags. Specialist auditors in both environments are associated with greater reporting of control exceptions, but specialization is only associated with shorter reporting lags with disclosure regulation. Using a small sample of survey data for one year, we find evidence that audit pricing is lower in the regulated state, and that specialist pricing varies based on regulation and each specialist audit firm's market positioning.