The English common law criminal defence and excuse of necessity: a critical comparison of the customary law and commonplace
Gary Lilienthal
Abstract
Gary Lilienthal
Abstract
A defendant turned off an oil pipeline argued and used the common law defence of necessity. The Court permitted the accused to argue that this action was necessary to decelerate calamitous climate change. The objective is to compare critically the development and use of the defence and excuse of necessity. The question is whether Lord Coleridge had a prejudging objective, in R v. Dudley and Stephens, and if so, what was it likely to have been. Necessity, as an excuse, is a categorical imperative because it is of the same structure as violating a law to save the state.
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A defendant turned off an oil pipeline argued and used the common law defence of necessity. The Court permitted the accused to argue that this action was necessary to decelerate calamitous climate change. The objective is to compare critically the development and use of the defence and excuse of necessity. The question is whether Lord Coleridge had a prejudging objective, in R v. Dudley and Stephens, and if so, what was it likely to have been. Necessity, as an excuse, is a categorical imperative because it is of the same structure as violating a law to save the state.
Key concepts: Excuse, Law, Criminal law, State (computer science), Action (physics), Political science, Common law, Law and economics