2016•arXiv (Cornell University)Open access

Characterizing Solution Concepts in Terms of Common Knowledge of Rationality

Joseph Yehuda Halpern, Yoram Moses

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Abstract

Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium using results of Halpern [2009].

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Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium using results of Halpern [2009].

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Available abstract

Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium using results of Halpern [2009].

Key concepts: Rationalizability, Rationality, Mathematical economics, Nash equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium, Common knowledge (logic), Equilibrium selection, Solution concept

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