Humean Scepticism as an Alternative in the Moral Realism and Moral Anti-Realism Debate

Traditionally, the realism and anti-realism debate within metaphysics has been restricted to a dichotomy between realism and anti-realism.This dichotomy trickles down to more specific areas within the debate.One of these areas effected by the traditional realism and anti-realism dichotomy is moral realism and moral anti-realism.This thesis focuses on moral realism and moral anti-realism, and shows that restricting the debate to only moral realism and moral anti-realism is a false dichotomy.It does this through providing an alternative option to the two traditionally given: Humean Scepticism.The goal of this thesis is to argue that Humean Scepticism is a viable third option in the moral realism and moral antirealism debate.This thesis demonstrates that scepticism should sometimes be taken seriously and acknowledged in some debates that it has traditionally been excluded from.Research Seminar.This thesis also would not have been possible without the Department of Philosophy Administrator, Sandra Kirkpatrick, and the Department of Philosophy Graduate Administrator, Kristopher Waddell.I have said this many times, but I will say it again: Sandy and Kris are like the parents of the department, keeping us all organized.Secondly, I would like to thank my cohort