2021Cambridge University Press eBooksRequires access

The British Tradition of Legal Positivism

Gerald J. Postema

Open publisher page 3 citations

Abstract

Postema argues that – contrary to the received opinion – we may view contemporary, post-Hartian British legal positivism or, more broadly, post-Hartian British jurisprudence, as having developed naturally from the legal philosophies put forward by Matthew Hale and Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, which in turn were part of an earlier and philosophically more ambitious, pre-positivist tradition, the thetic tradition, dating back to Jean Bodin, Marsilius of Padua and, ultimately, to Thomas Aquinas. Postema explains that if we do, we will see that instead of being a quirky ancestor of the British positivist tradition, Bentham appears as the high point of the thetic tradition, which came to an end when Austin decisively disengaged British jurisprudence from Bentham’s legal philosophy. We see, then, Postema continues, that Austin’s jurisprudence changed the direction of British jurisprudence decisively from the thetic tradition to a positivist approach to the study of jurisprudence, one that continues to this day and sees jurisprudence as separable from moral philosophy and metaphysics, as well as history, social theory and comparative studies.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Postema argues that – contrary to the received opinion – we may view contemporary, post-Hartian British legal positivism or, more broadly, post-Hartian British jurisprudence, as having developed naturally from the legal philosophies put forward by Matthew Hale and Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, which in turn were part of an earlier and philosophically more ambitious, pre-positivist tradition, the thetic tradition, dating back to Jean Bodin, Marsilius of Padua and, ultimately, to Thomas Aquinas. Postema explains that if we do, we will see that instead of being a quirky ancestor of the British positivist tradition, Bentham appears as the high point of the thetic tradition, which came to an end when Austin decisively disengaged British jurisprudence from Bentham’s legal philosophy. We see, then, Postema continues, that Austin’s jurisprudence changed the direction of British jurisprudence decisively from the thetic tradition to a positivist approach to the study of jurisprudence, one that continues to this day and sees jurisprudence as separable from moral philosophy and metaphysics, as well as history, social theory and comparative studies.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 3 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Postema argues that – contrary to the received opinion – we may view contemporary, post-Hartian British legal positivism or, more broadly, post-Hartian British jurisprudence, as having developed naturally from the legal philosophies put forward by Matthew Hale and Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, which in turn were part of an earlier and philosophically more ambitious, pre-positivist tradition, the thetic tradition, dating back to Jean Bodin, Marsilius of Padua and, ultimately, to Thomas Aquinas. Postema explains that if we do, we will see that instead of being a quirky ancestor of the British positivist tradition, Bentham appears as the high point of the thetic tradition, which came to an end when Austin decisively disengaged British jurisprudence from Bentham’s legal philosophy. We see, then, Postema continues, that Austin’s jurisprudence changed the direction of British jurisprudence decisively from the thetic tradition to a positivist approach to the study of jurisprudence, one that continues to this day and sees jurisprudence as separable from moral philosophy and metaphysics, as well as history, social theory and comparative studies.

Key concepts: Jurisprudence, Positivism, Legal positivism, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Law, Philosophy of law, Epistemology

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
The British Tradition of Legal Positivism — Research Paper | ScholarLens