2011•Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)Requires access

Will, Technology, and Tactical Command and Control

Leon H Rios

Open publisher page 3 citations

Abstract

The Army is becoming increasingly dependent on technical communications systems for command and control although the systems are vulnerable to failure, interception, or interference. The technical complexity of communications systems present new sets of problems rather than facilitating and sustaining command and control. This study examines the capability of U.S. Army tactical units to execute the commander's intent (will) using available communications systems in the context of current U.S. Army AirLand Battle doctrine. The study examines the functions of command and control relative to the tenets of AirLand Battle; historical precedents of battle losses because of technical difficulties in executing the commander's intent; limitations of current and future communications systems; and finally, implications of a dependence on technical communications systems for the execution of AirLand Battle doctrine at the tactical level. The study concludes that the Army can not subordinate command and control requirements to technology alone. Only through realistic training can a division's chain of command improve its capability to command and control an AirLand Battle force and execute the intent of the commander. Keywords: Communications technology; Will; Army training.

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What this paper is about

The Army is becoming increasingly dependent on technical communications systems for command and control although the systems are vulnerable to failure, interception, or interference. The technical complexity of communications systems present new sets of problems rather than facilitating and sustaining command and control. This study examines the capability of U.S. Army tactical units to execute the commander's intent (will) using available communications systems in the context of current U.S. Army AirLand Battle doctrine. The study examines the functions of command and control relative to the tenets of AirLand Battle; historical precedents of battle losses because of technical difficulties in executing the commander's intent; limitations of current and future communications systems; and finally, implications of a dependence on technical communications systems for the execution of AirLand Battle doctrine at the tactical level. The study concludes that the Army can not subordinate command and control requirements to technology alone. Only through realistic training can a division's chain of command improve its capability to command and control an AirLand Battle force and execute the intent of the commander. Keywords: Communications technology; Will; Army training.

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Available abstract

The Army is becoming increasingly dependent on technical communications systems for command and control although the systems are vulnerable to failure, interception, or interference. The technical complexity of communications systems present new sets of problems rather than facilitating and sustaining command and control. This study examines the capability of U.S. Army tactical units to execute the commander's intent (will) using available communications systems in the context of current U.S. Army AirLand Battle doctrine. The study examines the functions of command and control relative to the tenets of AirLand Battle; historical precedents of battle losses because of technical difficulties in executing the commander's intent; limitations of current and future communications systems; and finally, implications of a dependence on technical communications systems for the execution of AirLand Battle doctrine at the tactical level. The study concludes that the Army can not subordinate command and control requirements to technology alone. Only through realistic training can a division's chain of command improve its capability to command and control an AirLand Battle force and execute the intent of the commander. Keywords: Communications technology; Will; Army training.

Key concepts: Battle, Command and control, Tactical communications, Doctrine, Control (management), Context (archaeology), Engineering, Computer security

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