Avicenna against Mathematical Platonism
Mohammad Saleh Zarepour
Abstract
Mohammad Saleh Zarepour
Abstract
Abstract In this paper I investigate Avicenna’s criticisms of the separateness of mathematical objects and of the view that they are principles for natural things. These two theses form the core of Plato’s view of mathematics; i.e., mathematical Platonism. Surprisingly, Avicenna does not consider his arguments against these theses as attacks on Plato. This is because his understanding of Plato’s philosophy of mathematics differs from both Plato’s original view and what Aristotle attributes to Plato.
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Abstract In this paper I investigate Avicenna’s criticisms of the separateness of mathematical objects and of the view that they are principles for natural things. These two theses form the core of Plato’s view of mathematics; i.e., mathematical Platonism. Surprisingly, Avicenna does not consider his arguments against these theses as attacks on Plato. This is because his understanding of Plato’s philosophy of mathematics differs from both Plato’s original view and what Aristotle attributes to Plato.
Key concepts: Platonism, Philosophy of mathematics, Philosophy, Epistemology, Mathematical practice, Natural (archaeology), Platonic idealism, Mathematics