NATO, nuclear strategy, and the Cold War

This chapter examines how the criticism of massive retaliation slowly made its way through the networks and publications of the informal alliance and ended up influencing decision-makers, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials, and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. It argues that the Bilderberg discussions on nuclear strategy, disarmament, and Soviet intentions served to disseminate information and expertise that was hard to get by, particularly for participants from the non-nuclear nations. The chapter shows how the Bilderberg conferences also provided an important forum for critics of the Eisenhower Administration&s;s strong reliance on nuclear weapons. The nuclearization of NATO had been designed to increase the alliance&s;s trust in a credible defense of Europe without destroying the economic and political basis of the West. The Garmisch discussions showed, however, that the Eisenhower Administration&s;s nuclear rhetoric might have exactly the opposite effect. The most important reason why massive retaliation was no longer credible was the rapidly developing Soviet nuclear arsenal.