Consumer's Behavior under Different Economic Scenarios: Willingness to Bargain, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Buy
Despoina Parasyri
Abstract
Open-access reader
Despoina Parasyri
Abstract
Open-access reader
In this paper, we focus on bargaining within male-female pairs, the most pervasive partnership in humankind since prehistory.We analyze data from an ultimatum game experiment played by subjects of different genders, and parallel to this, we introduce a one-way communication protocol according to which the responders can send short messages to the proposers after making their decisions.The analysis shows that gender and message effects exist and that males can bargain more effectively.
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In this paper, we focus on bargaining within male-female pairs, the most pervasive partnership in humankind since prehistory.We analyze data from an ultimatum game experiment played by subjects of different genders, and parallel to this, we introduce a one-way communication protocol according to which the responders can send short messages to the proposers after making their decisions.The analysis shows that gender and message effects exist and that males can bargain more effectively.
Key concepts: Willingness to pay, Ultimatum game, Willingness to accept, General partnership, Economics, Microeconomics, Focus (optics), Advertising