2018Unpublished venueRequires access

Administrative Government: Part 1

Joe B. Stevens

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Abstract

This chapter starts with historical review of public administration. It considers the venerable notion of iron triangles, or sub-governments within government, followed by the first major economic model of bureaucratic government, Niskanen&s;s budget maximization model. The chapter looks at two ways that legislators might exercise control over appointed suppliers. The first involves the economics of organization or hierarchy. The second concept deals with agenda control for stabilizing and directing outcomes. According to Berry (1989), the iron triangle, or subgovernment, concept can be traced to Ernest Griffith&s;s Impasse of Democracy (1939). It has long been a staple in political science and public administration. The early concept of iron triangles, or subgovernments, was based on consensus rather than conflict. Small clusters of representatives, agency heads, and interest groups would work together to decide and implement policy in particular areas such as water resources.

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What this paper is about

This chapter starts with historical review of public administration. It considers the venerable notion of iron triangles, or sub-governments within government, followed by the first major economic model of bureaucratic government, Niskanen&s;s budget maximization model. The chapter looks at two ways that legislators might exercise control over appointed suppliers. The first involves the economics of organization or hierarchy. The second concept deals with agenda control for stabilizing and directing outcomes. According to Berry (1989), the iron triangle, or subgovernment, concept can be traced to Ernest Griffith&s;s Impasse of Democracy (1939). It has long been a staple in political science and public administration. The early concept of iron triangles, or subgovernments, was based on consensus rather than conflict. Small clusters of representatives, agency heads, and interest groups would work together to decide and implement policy in particular areas such as water resources.

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Available abstract

This chapter starts with historical review of public administration. It considers the venerable notion of iron triangles, or sub-governments within government, followed by the first major economic model of bureaucratic government, Niskanen&s;s budget maximization model. The chapter looks at two ways that legislators might exercise control over appointed suppliers. The first involves the economics of organization or hierarchy. The second concept deals with agenda control for stabilizing and directing outcomes. According to Berry (1989), the iron triangle, or subgovernment, concept can be traced to Ernest Griffith&s;s Impasse of Democracy (1939). It has long been a staple in political science and public administration. The early concept of iron triangles, or subgovernments, was based on consensus rather than conflict. Small clusters of representatives, agency heads, and interest groups would work together to decide and implement policy in particular areas such as water resources.

Key concepts: Government (linguistics), Computer science, Business, Philosophy, Linguistics

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