Perspective Shifting: Alternating Between 'Self' and 'Other' in the Theory of Mind Mechanism
Elisabeth E.F. Bradford, Ines Jentzsch, Juan Carlos Gómez
Abstract
Elisabeth E.F. Bradford, Ines Jentzsch, Juan Carlos Gómez
Abstract
This research explored differentiation between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in belief-attribution abilities (part of the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism). Adult participants completed a computerized false-belief task in which they attributed beliefs to themselves and other people, in a matched design, assessing behavioural and neural correlates of belief-attribution to the ‘self’ and ‘other’. Participants responded faster to self-oriented than other-oriented questions, and this distinction was supported by electroencephalography (EEG) measures, largest across central parietal lobes from 550ms after stimulus onset. Importantly, when a ‘perspective-shift’ was required within a trial, shifting from Self-to-Other was significantly slower than shifting from Other-to-Self. In contrast, in ‘no perspective-shift’ trials, no difference was observed between Self-to-Self and Other-to-Other trials. The results indicate that the ‘Self’ is consistently processed, whilst the ‘Other’ is only processed when explicitly necessary. Results support the notion of a Self/Other differentiation within the ToM mechanism, at both a behavioural and neural level.
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This research explored differentiation between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in belief-attribution abilities (part of the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism). Adult participants completed a computerized false-belief task in which they attributed beliefs to themselves and other people, in a matched design, assessing behavioural and neural correlates of belief-attribution to the ‘self’ and ‘other’. Participants responded faster to self-oriented than other-oriented questions, and this distinction was supported by electroencephalography (EEG) measures, largest across central parietal lobes from 550ms after stimulus onset. Importantly, when a ‘perspective-shift’ was required within a trial, shifting from Self-to-Other was significantly slower than shifting from Other-to-Self. In contrast, in ‘no perspective-shift’ trials, no difference was observed between Self-to-Self and Other-to-Other trials. The results indicate that the ‘Self’ is consistently processed, whilst the ‘Other’ is only processed when explicitly necessary. Results support the notion of a Self/Other differentiation within the ToM mechanism, at both a behavioural and neural level.
Key concepts: Mechanism (biology), Perspective (graphical), Cognitive science, Theory of mind, Psychology, Computer science, Epistemology, Neuroscience