The problem of free will and determinism: an incompatibilist-friendly view

This dissertation is intended as a contribution to the contemporary debate in analytic philosophy regarding whether determinism is compatible with free will (construed, very roughly, as the control over behavior that grounds moral responsibility). Chapter One introduces the problem of free will and determinism, the contemporary analytic debate about this problem, and the view I will argue for: that a certain kind of indeterminism would enhance our rational control over our intentional actions. In Chapter Two, I provide some philosophy of action background to the free will debate. In Chapter Three, I criticize two insightful and influential arguments against incompatibilism (i.e., the view that free will is incompatible with determinism), and conclude that neither of these arguments shows that a suitable indeterminism would decrease our control over our behavior. In Chapter Four, I argue against manipulation arguments for incompatibilism, and concede that there is a plausible case to be made in favor of the idea that indeterminism would not enhance control; however, I argue, a suitable indeterminism would enhance our rational control over our intentional actions. In Chapter Five, I motivate the rather uncontroversial thesis that there is a historical condition on free action: if an action is the direct consequence of hypnosis, brainwashing, social conditioning, brainmanipulation by neuroscientists, or the like, then the action is not free. I argue for a modest historical condition on free action (less demanding than Kane?s and Mele?s conditions, for instance), and I criticize Galen Strawson?s Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Among other things, I conclude in this chapter that, as they act through the years, paradigmatically (prima facie) free and responsible agents gain more and more control over their attitudes and tendencies. Finally, in Chapter Six, I conclude that, even though a certain kind of indeterminism would enhance our rational control over our intentional actions (and, as a consequence, over suitably related omissions, unintentional actions, and the acquisition and maintenance of certain attitudes and tendencies), the truth of incompatibilism remains unclear, because it is unclear that this control-enhancement is necessary for responsibility, especially given that the truth of determinism would leave room for a significant amount of control. In sum, I do not defend or even adopt incompatibilism, but my dissertation is incompatibilist-friendly in that it tries to carry out a task that any incompatibilist account must face: that of defending that a suitable indeterminism would not only be harmless for the kind of control that grounds moral responsibility, but that it would enhance this kind of control.