Simple algorithmic techniques to approximate nash equilibria
Panagiota N. Panagopoulou
Abstract
Panagiota N. Panagopoulou
Abstract
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games. We first give an approximation scheme for Nash equilibria in such games. Even though this scheme is not polynomial-time, it gives an interesting performance guarantee that depends on structural properties of the (exact) Nash equilibria of the game.
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We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games. We first give an approximation scheme for Nash equilibria in such games. Even though this scheme is not polynomial-time, it gives an interesting performance guarantee that depends on structural properties of the (exact) Nash equilibria of the game.
Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Simple (philosophy), Best response, Scheme (mathematics), Epsilon-equilibrium, Mathematical optimization, Correlated equilibrium, Game theory