Will Khan Foster or Hinder Franchising? An Economic Analysis of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance
Roger D. Blair, Francine Lafontaine
Abstract
Roger D. Blair, Francine Lafontaine
Abstract
In this article, the authors consider the economic consequences of State Oil v. Khan (1997) for franchising. After discussing the evolution of antitrust policy regarding maximum resale prices, they examine the economics behind franchisors’ desire to impose price ceilings on franchisees. The authors show that the most likely explanations for this practice imply that maximum resale prices enhance consumer welfare.
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In this article, the authors consider the economic consequences of State Oil v. Khan (1997) for franchising. After discussing the evolution of antitrust policy regarding maximum resale prices, they examine the economics behind franchisors’ desire to impose price ceilings on franchisees. The authors show that the most likely explanations for this practice imply that maximum resale prices enhance consumer welfare.
Key concepts: Resale price maintenance, Consumer welfare, Economics, State (computer science), Economic analysis, Microeconomics, Welfare, Public economics