2018Unpublished venueRequires access

Humanitarian intervention and R2P

Simon Arthur Chesterman

Open publisher page 2 citations

Abstract

The status of humanitarian intervention in international law is, on the face of it, simple—the Charter clearly prohibits the use of force. This chapter presents the international rules governing the use of force and the attempts—largely unsuccessful—to fit humanitarian intervention into those rules. It examines the claim that certain cases of alleged humanitarian intervention might best be seen as "exceptions" to the rule, or situations in which the rule can be disregarded. The chapter considers the emergence of the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) as an attempt at a new framing of the old legal questions. The case of Libya suggests the wariness of the Security Council in embracing R2P—even in what one might regard as a perfect case for its application. In the context of humanitarian intervention, many appeared to hope that a departure from "traditional" conceptions of sovereignty and international law would privilege ethics over states&s; rights.

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What this paper is about

The status of humanitarian intervention in international law is, on the face of it, simple—the Charter clearly prohibits the use of force. This chapter presents the international rules governing the use of force and the attempts—largely unsuccessful—to fit humanitarian intervention into those rules. It examines the claim that certain cases of alleged humanitarian intervention might best be seen as "exceptions" to the rule, or situations in which the rule can be disregarded. The chapter considers the emergence of the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) as an attempt at a new framing of the old legal questions. The case of Libya suggests the wariness of the Security Council in embracing R2P—even in what one might regard as a perfect case for its application. In the context of humanitarian intervention, many appeared to hope that a departure from "traditional" conceptions of sovereignty and international law would privilege ethics over states&s; rights.

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Available abstract

The status of humanitarian intervention in international law is, on the face of it, simple—the Charter clearly prohibits the use of force. This chapter presents the international rules governing the use of force and the attempts—largely unsuccessful—to fit humanitarian intervention into those rules. It examines the claim that certain cases of alleged humanitarian intervention might best be seen as "exceptions" to the rule, or situations in which the rule can be disregarded. The chapter considers the emergence of the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) as an attempt at a new framing of the old legal questions. The case of Libya suggests the wariness of the Security Council in embracing R2P—even in what one might regard as a perfect case for its application. In the context of humanitarian intervention, many appeared to hope that a departure from "traditional" conceptions of sovereignty and international law would privilege ethics over states&s; rights.

Key concepts: Humanitarian intervention, Responsibility to protect, Framing (construction), Charter, Political science, Sovereignty, Law, Intervention (counseling)

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