2019ElectronicsOpen access

Enhanced Time-of-Use Electricity Price Rate Using Game Theory

Adia Khalid, Nadeem Javaid, Abdul Mateen, Manzoor Ilahi, Tanzila Saba, Amjad Rehman

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Abstract

The emergence of the Demand Response (DR) program optimizes the energy consumption pattern of customers and improves the efficacy of energy supply. The pricing infra-structure of the DR program is dynamic (time-based). It has rather complex features including marginal costs, demand and seasonal parameters. There is variation in DR price rate. Sometime prices go high (peak load) if the demand of electricity is more than the generation capacity. The main objective of DR is to encourage the consumer to shift the peak load and gets incentives in terms of cost reduction. However, prices remain the same for all the users even if they shift the peak load or not. In this work, Game Theory (GT)-based Time-of-Use (ToU) pricing model is presented to define the rates for on-peak and shoulder-peak hours. The price is defined for each user according to the utilize load. At first, the proposed model is examined using the ToU pricing scheme. Afterward, it is evaluated using existing day-ahead real-time pricing scheme. Moreover, shifting load from on-peak hours to off-peak hours may cause rebound peak in off-peak hours. To avert this issue, we analysis the impact of Salp Swam Algorithm (SSA) and Rainfall Algorithm (RFA) on user electricity bill and PAR after scheduling. The experimental results show the effectiveness of the proposed GT-based ToU pricing scheme. Furthermore, the RFA outperformed SSA.

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What this paper is about

The emergence of the Demand Response (DR) program optimizes the energy consumption pattern of customers and improves the efficacy of energy supply. The pricing infra-structure of the DR program is dynamic (time-based). It has rather complex features including marginal costs, demand and seasonal parameters. There is variation in DR price rate. Sometime prices go high (peak load) if the demand of electricity is more than the generation capacity. The main objective of DR is to encourage the consumer to shift the peak load and gets incentives in terms of cost reduction. However, prices remain the same for all the users even if they shift the peak load or not. In this work, Game Theory (GT)-based Time-of-Use (ToU) pricing model is presented to define the rates for on-peak and shoulder-peak hours. The price is defined for each user according to the utilize load. At first, the proposed model is examined using the ToU pricing scheme. Afterward, it is evaluated using existing day-ahead real-time pricing scheme. Moreover, shifting load from on-peak hours to off-peak hours may cause rebound peak in off-peak hours. To avert this issue, we analysis the impact of Salp Swam Algorithm (SSA) and Rainfall Algorithm (RFA) on user electricity bill and PAR after scheduling. The experimental results show the effectiveness of the proposed GT-based ToU pricing scheme. Furthermore, the RFA outperformed SSA.

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Available abstract

The emergence of the Demand Response (DR) program optimizes the energy consumption pattern of customers and improves the efficacy of energy supply. The pricing infra-structure of the DR program is dynamic (time-based). It has rather complex features including marginal costs, demand and seasonal parameters. There is variation in DR price rate. Sometime prices go high (peak load) if the demand of electricity is more than the generation capacity. The main objective of DR is to encourage the consumer to shift the peak load and gets incentives in terms of cost reduction. However, prices remain the same for all the users even if they shift the peak load or not. In this work, Game Theory (GT)-based Time-of-Use (ToU) pricing model is presented to define the rates for on-peak and shoulder-peak hours. The price is defined for each user according to the utilize load. At first, the proposed model is examined using the ToU pricing scheme. Afterward, it is evaluated using existing day-ahead real-time pricing scheme. Moreover, shifting load from on-peak hours to off-peak hours may cause rebound peak in off-peak hours. To avert this issue, we analysis the impact of Salp Swam Algorithm (SSA) and Rainfall Algorithm (RFA) on user electricity bill and PAR after scheduling. The experimental results show the effectiveness of the proposed GT-based ToU pricing scheme. Furthermore, the RFA outperformed SSA.

Key concepts: Electricity pricing, Electricity, Demand response, Incentive, Peak demand, Electricity price, Load shifting, Marginal cost

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