2017Unpublished venueRequires access

Hume and Miracles

Mark Corner

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Abstract

This chapter considers David Hume&s;s position in detail, and picks up on a point discussed, namely the sense in which one person&s;s &s;miracle&s; may be another person&s;s undiscovered law of nature. It considers Hume&s;s &s;sceptical rule&s; which effectively rules out belief in any miracles whatsoever, by arguing that it is always more plausible to believe that the witnesses to a miracle lied or were deceived than that some &s;signal violation of the laws of nature&s; took place. By comparing the resurrection of Jesus to that claimed for Elizabeth I, the author pointed out that there are a host of considerations involved in assessing claims about miracles which have nothing to do with the issue of transgressing laws of nature but rather with weighing historical evidence. The chapter concludes by arguing that it is, always possible to explain what has happened in terms of hitherto undiscovered laws — for instance ones that have been kept secret.

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This chapter considers David Hume&s;s position in detail, and picks up on a point discussed, namely the sense in which one person&s;s &s;miracle&s; may be another person&s;s undiscovered law of nature. It considers Hume&s;s &s;sceptical rule&s; which effectively rules out belief in any miracles whatsoever, by arguing that it is always more plausible to believe that the witnesses to a miracle lied or were deceived than that some &s;signal violation of the laws of nature&s; took place. By comparing the resurrection of Jesus to that claimed for Elizabeth I, the author pointed out that there are a host of considerations involved in assessing claims about miracles which have nothing to do with the issue of transgressing laws of nature but rather with weighing historical evidence. The chapter concludes by arguing that it is, always possible to explain what has happened in terms of hitherto undiscovered laws — for instance ones that have been kept secret.

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Available abstract

This chapter considers David Hume&s;s position in detail, and picks up on a point discussed, namely the sense in which one person&s;s &s;miracle&s; may be another person&s;s undiscovered law of nature. It considers Hume&s;s &s;sceptical rule&s; which effectively rules out belief in any miracles whatsoever, by arguing that it is always more plausible to believe that the witnesses to a miracle lied or were deceived than that some &s;signal violation of the laws of nature&s; took place. By comparing the resurrection of Jesus to that claimed for Elizabeth I, the author pointed out that there are a host of considerations involved in assessing claims about miracles which have nothing to do with the issue of transgressing laws of nature but rather with weighing historical evidence. The chapter concludes by arguing that it is, always possible to explain what has happened in terms of hitherto undiscovered laws — for instance ones that have been kept secret.

Key concepts: Philosophy, Epistemology, History

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