The unloveliness of moral education
Michael Hand
Abstract
Michael Hand
Abstract
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts covered in the preceding chapters of this book. The book expresses that a central aim of moral education – that of bringing it about that children subscribe to moral standards and believe them to be justified – is defensible and realisable. There is a set of conflict-averting and cooperation-sustaining standards to which full moral commitment can and should be cultivated. The book addresses the worry that moral education is a rather unpleasant business. It offers two kinds of response to this worry. The first is to admit that the accusation of unloveliness has some force: the ugliness of some moral emotions is a bullet that has to be bitten by the defender of rational moral education. The second response, though, is to put up some resistance to the charge: notwithstanding the prominence it gives to guilt and blame, rational moral education is not nearly as unlovely as White suggests.
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This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts covered in the preceding chapters of this book. The book expresses that a central aim of moral education – that of bringing it about that children subscribe to moral standards and believe them to be justified – is defensible and realisable. There is a set of conflict-averting and cooperation-sustaining standards to which full moral commitment can and should be cultivated. The book addresses the worry that moral education is a rather unpleasant business. It offers two kinds of response to this worry. The first is to admit that the accusation of unloveliness has some force: the ugliness of some moral emotions is a bullet that has to be bitten by the defender of rational moral education. The second response, though, is to put up some resistance to the charge: notwithstanding the prominence it gives to guilt and blame, rational moral education is not nearly as unlovely as White suggests.
Key concepts: Moral education, Psychology, Sociology, Pedagogy