Fiscal decentralisation and fiscal discipline
Matteo Governatori, David Yim
Abstract
Open-access reader
Matteo Governatori, David Yim
Abstract
Open-access reader
This section analyses the relationship between fiscal decentralisation to the subnational level and fiscal outcomes for general government. (26) The purpose is to assess whether devolving expenditure functions and revenue sources to subnational entities, as has generally occurred across the euro area, may have adverse consequences on overall government fiscal balances. Such consequences might be due to loss of central government control over subnational fiscal behaviour and to weaker incentives for fiscal discipline at that level.
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This section analyses the relationship between fiscal decentralisation to the subnational level and fiscal outcomes for general government. (26) The purpose is to assess whether devolving expenditure functions and revenue sources to subnational entities, as has generally occurred across the euro area, may have adverse consequences on overall government fiscal balances. Such consequences might be due to loss of central government control over subnational fiscal behaviour and to weaker incentives for fiscal discipline at that level.
Key concepts: Decentralization, Fiscal imbalance, Fiscal federalism, Fiscal union, Economics, Revenue, Fiscal policy, Government (linguistics)