2018•Alternative Law JournalRequires access

Securing the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s independence: Tenure and mechanisms of appointment

James D. Morgan

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal must be independent from inappropriate influence, and the perception of such influence, in order to effectively perform its duties of de novo merits review of government decisions. Drawing on recent controversies surrounding the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in 2017, this article concludes that the current mechanisms of Administrative Appeals Tribunal member reappointment exposes the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to a risk of inappropriate influence by the government of the day or at least a risk of public perception to that effect. After examining several possible reforms to minimise this risk, this paper proposes the creation of an independent reappointment committee for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal must be independent from inappropriate influence, and the perception of such influence, in order to effectively perform its duties of de novo merits review of government decisions. Drawing on recent controversies surrounding the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in 2017, this article concludes that the current mechanisms of Administrative Appeals Tribunal member reappointment exposes the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to a risk of inappropriate influence by the government of the day or at least a risk of public perception to that effect. After examining several possible reforms to minimise this risk, this paper proposes the creation of an independent reappointment committee for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal must be independent from inappropriate influence, and the perception of such influence, in order to effectively perform its duties of de novo merits review of government decisions. Drawing on recent controversies surrounding the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in 2017, this article concludes that the current mechanisms of Administrative Appeals Tribunal member reappointment exposes the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to a risk of inappropriate influence by the government of the day or at least a risk of public perception to that effect. After examining several possible reforms to minimise this risk, this paper proposes the creation of an independent reappointment committee for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

Key concepts: Tribunal, Independence (probability theory), Government (linguistics), Law, Administrative law, Order (exchange), Political science, Public administration

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Securing the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s independence: Tenure and mechanisms of appointment — Research Paper | ScholarLens