Relativism, Pragmatism, and the Practice of Science
Arthur Fine
Abstract
Arthur Fine
Abstract
Abstract But science in the making, science as an end to be pursued, is as subjective and psychologically conditioned as any other branch of human endeavor— so much so that the question, What is the purpose and meaning of science? receives quite different answers at different times and from different sorts of people. (Einstein 1934: 112) Relativism is worrisome. Many regard it as a bad thing; a virus set to infect your whole way of thinking if your ideas seem to leave even a small opening for it. Others profess to believe that relativism is quite a good thing. Since no one knows exactly what relativism is, both camps could be right. Here I examine some non-idiotic forms of relativism whose ‘dangers’, I argue, amount to no more than an anti-foundationalism familiar from the pragmatic tradition. Seen pragmatically, relativism turns out to be robust with respect to standard anti-relativist arguments. Seen pragmatically, it might also help soothe the anxiety over nihilism or irrationality (or general chaos) that it triggers in some. For, as I suggest, pragmatic forms of relativism offer an appropriate setting for understanding good scientific practice.
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Abstract But science in the making, science as an end to be pursued, is as subjective and psychologically conditioned as any other branch of human endeavor— so much so that the question, What is the purpose and meaning of science? receives quite different answers at different times and from different sorts of people. (Einstein 1934: 112) Relativism is worrisome. Many regard it as a bad thing; a virus set to infect your whole way of thinking if your ideas seem to leave even a small opening for it. Others profess to believe that relativism is quite a good thing. Since no one knows exactly what relativism is, both camps could be right. Here I examine some non-idiotic forms of relativism whose ‘dangers’, I argue, amount to no more than an anti-foundationalism familiar from the pragmatic tradition. Seen pragmatically, relativism turns out to be robust with respect to standard anti-relativist arguments. Seen pragmatically, it might also help soothe the anxiety over nihilism or irrationality (or general chaos) that it triggers in some. For, as I suggest, pragmatic forms of relativism offer an appropriate setting for understanding good scientific practice.
Key concepts: Relativism, Epistemology, Foundationalism, Philosophy, Pragmatism, Meaning (existential)