Wisdom as the Only Good: Socrates’s Philosophical Protreptic at Euthydemus 278e-282a

Socrates in the Euthydemus between 278e-282a, attempts to demonstrate how he would like someone to be turned to the pursuit of philosophy. He does so by engaging in a discussion on the nature of wisdom and of happiness, with a young man named Cleinias. This discussion is incredibly controversial, with commentators widely disagreeing over how to interpret the nature of the claims made. While some have suggested that this section of the dialogue is the locus classicus for the bold Socratic claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness, other commentators have suggested that Socrates’ goals and intentions are substantially more modest. This thesis argues for the claim, that Socrates does in fact engage in a defence of both the sufficiency and necessity of virtue for happiness. I argue that Socrates takes up some commonly held attitudes towards the goods, and their relationship to happiness, with the intention of radically revising them. In so doing, Socrates will argue that while many people believe that the possession of good things will make their lives happy, there is in fact only one good capable of playing this role – there is only one good that can make a life happy. Wisdom, because it is good in a unique and unconditional way, is the only good which can make someone’s life happy. As such, Cleinias should take up the pursuit of philosophy, because it is only by taking up philosophy that he can obtain this good.