Defense Acquisitions: Zumwalt-Class Destroyer Program Emblematic of Challenges Facing Navy Shipbuilding
Paul Francis
Abstract
Paul Francis
Abstract
DDG 1000 development has been framed by challenging multimission requirements, resultant numerous new technologies, and a cost and schedule budget that added to-rather than eased-the challenge. While the Navy has done much work to try to manage the program within these competing goals, it will begin lead ship construction in October 2008 with significant uncertainties, particularly in developing the ship's design, key components, and the ship software system. Recent restructuring of the schedule buys more time for technology development, but shifts key efforts like installation and testing of the combat systems until later in the construction schedule-after the ships have been initially delivered. Such compromises-made before construction has even begun-suggest that the Navy already has little margin for solving future problems without adding money and time. In fact, it appears that the budget for the lead ships is not adequate to deliver fully operational ships. The complexity and unique features of DDG 1000, along with the design work, testing, and actual construction experience to come, add to the risk of cost growth.
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DDG 1000 development has been framed by challenging multimission requirements, resultant numerous new technologies, and a cost and schedule budget that added to-rather than eased-the challenge. While the Navy has done much work to try to manage the program within these competing goals, it will begin lead ship construction in October 2008 with significant uncertainties, particularly in developing the ship's design, key components, and the ship software system. Recent restructuring of the schedule buys more time for technology development, but shifts key efforts like installation and testing of the combat systems until later in the construction schedule-after the ships have been initially delivered. Such compromises-made before construction has even begun-suggest that the Navy already has little margin for solving future problems without adding money and time. In fact, it appears that the budget for the lead ships is not adequate to deliver fully operational ships. The complexity and unique features of DDG 1000, along with the design work, testing, and actual construction experience to come, add to the risk of cost growth.
Key concepts: Navy, Schedule, Shipbuilding, Restructuring, Naval architecture, Key (lock), Work (physics), Engineering