Buddhist Philosophy of Mind: Nāgārjuna’s Critique of Mind-Body Dualism From His Rebirth Arguments
Sonam Thakchöe
Abstract
Sonam Thakchöe
Abstract
Richard Hayes (1993, 2013) and Dan Arnold (2008, 2012) have argued that Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660 C.E.) is a mind-body dualist. The proof, they say, lies in the justification he gives for his theory of rebirth. In this paper, I put Dharmakīrti’s argument to the test against a rival argument of Nāgārjuna. It turns out Nāgārjuna completely rejects the mind-body dualism of Dharmakīrti and the rebirth theory built upon it.
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Richard Hayes (1993, 2013) and Dan Arnold (2008, 2012) have argued that Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660 C.E.) is a mind-body dualist. The proof, they say, lies in the justification he gives for his theory of rebirth. In this paper, I put Dharmakīrti’s argument to the test against a rival argument of Nāgārjuna. It turns out Nāgārjuna completely rejects the mind-body dualism of Dharmakīrti and the rebirth theory built upon it.
Key concepts: Dualism, Philosophy, Buddhism, Argument (complex analysis), Mind–body problem, Epistemology, Theology, Chemistry